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he following is an expanded written version of my reply to Rosanna 
Keefe’s paper ‘Modelling higher-order vagueness: columns, 
borderlines and boundaries’ (Keefe 2015), which in turn is a reply to 
my paper ‘Columnar higher-order vagueness, or Vagueness is higher-
order vagueness’ (Bobzien 2015). Both papers were presented at the 
Joint Session of the the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association in 
July, 2015. At the Joint Session meeting, there was insufficient time to 
present all of my points in response to Keefe’s paper. In addition, the 
audio of the session, which is available online1 becomes inaudible at the 
beginning of my reply to Keefe’s comments due to a technical defect. 
The following is a full version of my remarks.  
 
First let me repeat that I am thankful to Rosanna Keefe for her set of 
comments, which made me see more clearly various points of the theory 
I propose. Second, the reader should be aware that Keefe explicitly and 
deliberately chose not to engage with the core element of my paper.2 The 
paper’s core element is the normal modal logic that one obtains by 
adding the axiom FINAX to the fixed-domain first-order modal system 
QKT4M+BF (or QS4M+BF). Other than in my paper, the logic 
QKT4M+BF+FINAX has so far not attained any philosophical 
application, and the logic KT4M has only been used to illustrate a rather 
obscure notion of time. Keefe says nothing at all specifically about the 
logic QKT4M+BF+FINAX and how I link it to vagueness and higher-
order vagueness. She does also not say anything at all specifically about 
the logic KT4M (S4M). Yet, it is this specific logic QKT4M+BF+FINAX 
by which columnar higher-order vagueness is defined, and it is this specific 
logic that gives the proposed theory, that vagueness is higher-order 
vagueness, its character and its strengths. Thus, in order to learn what 
                                                          
1 The audio version contains audible summary versions of my paper and of Keefe’s 
reply. It can be found here  
https://lecturecapture.warwick.ac.uk/ess/echo/presentation/15cf5dd2-f22b-49d6-
a393-0a613a9caf5d?ec=true 
2 ‘In Bobzien (2015), one of Bobzien’s main aims is to take the propositional modal 
logic she has defended elsewhere and develop and explore an extension to first-order 
logic. I will focus, however, on more general questions about the suitability of the 
general framework for capturing vagueness.’ (Keefe 2015, p 92). Keefe rigorously 
avoids talking about the main body of my paper. 
T 
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columnar higher-order vagueness is, and what its strengths are, the 
reader will have to revert to my original paper, or at least to its audio 
summary. The reader would also need to devote at least a minimal effort 
to studying the basic features of the logic QKT4M+BF+FINAX.  
 
Instead of focusing on the core of my paper, Keefe focuses on some 
more general questions regarding the overall framework of my theory. 
These are questions that I have discussed either in previously published 
papers or in forthcoming papers.3 I note that many of Keefe’s points of 
criticism hold equally against epistemicist theories of vagueness, and 
indeed against the majority of currently predominant theories of 
vagueness. Thus in many respects, Keefe’s paper at least implicitly 
registers discontent with most prevailing approaches to vagueness.  
 
In the following, I first take up some of Keefe’s more major points in 
each of her five sections and then supplement this with a list of smaller 
items, page by page, mainly noting instances where Keefe appears to 
have misread or misunderstood my paper.   
 
Keefe’s main criticism in her Section I: clear borderline cases  
Keefe’s main point of criticism in her Section 1 (pp. 9094) concerns the 
existence of clear borderline cases. It is a main element of my theory of 
higher-order vagueness that there are no clear borderline cases that are 
relevant to a modal representation of higher-order vagueness. Simplified, 
I interpret borderlineness of a with regard to F as the inability of 
qualified individuals to determine whether Fa. Here then is Keefe’s 
argument:  
 
<Bobzien> claims that in presenting a as a clear borderline 
case of F,  
[Y]ou must be able to distinguish a from the non-
borderline F cases and the non-borderline ¬F cases. But 
this means, I maintain, that you have, perhaps 
inadvertently and at least temporarily, shifted to the above-
described in-between borderlineness, or still another kind 
of borderlineness, and that you equivocate on ‘borderline’. 
(Bobzien 2015, p.80) 
Why think this? Why not think that you can determine that 
you can’t determine that a is F (i.e. invoking <Bobzien’s> 
undecidability conception)? (Keefe 2015, p. 94) 
 
First, I note, that the passage Keefe quotes is not in the part of the paper 
in which I set out my view, but rather in its last section, in which I reply 
to certain common objections, and that what she quotes is part (and part 
only!) of my reply to Objection 1, that there is – assumed to be – evidence 
                                                          
3 Bobzien (forthcoming).  
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that there are clear borderline cases (= Objection 1a). (The distinction 
between in-between borderlineness and undecidability borderlineness 
that Keefe mentions is set out summarily on pp. 7780 of Bobzien 
2015.) Now, Keefe’s objection to my reply to Objection 1a is in fact 
identical with my own Objection 1b from the paragraph directly following 
her quote. Here is the objection:  
 
Objection 1b: I can tell that I can’t tell whether this object is 
F. So this object is clearly borderline F. (p. 80)  
 
And my reply to Objection 1b is this:  
 
‘Reply: Given the interpretation of operators C and B (§§i 
and ii above <i.e.  pp 638>, if you actually can tell that you 
can’t tell (as opposed to mistakenly believing you can), 
there are two possibilities: (i) you use a notion of tellability 
that includes lack of qualification of individuals and thus is 
not the one suggested. (‘I can tell that I can’t tell whether 
Fa, but don’t rule out that someone better qualified might 
be able to tell that Fa’); (ii) you use the notion of tellability 
introduced above. That notion abstracts from all individual 
human handicaps. As a result, if you can tell that you can’t 
tell, there must be something in a with regard to the predicate F 
that you pick up on and that allows you to distinguish a 
from those cases that are non-borderline F and non-
borderline not-F. In that case, again, I maintain that you 
have, perhaps inadvertently and at least temporarily, shifted 
to using ‘borderline’ for in-between borderlineness, and 
not as it is used in this paper, that is, for undecidability 
borderlineness, and that you may be equivocating on 
‘borderline’.’ (p. 81) 
 
So, in the very paper on which Keefe comments, in the very paragraph 
that follows the one that triggers her objection, I provide (i) the 
objection she puts forward and (ii) a reply to that objection. Keefe seems 
to have overlooked this fact. 
 
Keefe’s main criticism in her Section II: borderline clear cases 
Keefe’s main criticism in her Section II (pp. 9596) concerns borderline-
clearly-F cases and borderline-clearly-not-F cases, where for the first it 
holds that ¬CCFa ¬C¬CFa and for the second it holds that 
¬C¬C¬Fa ¬CC¬Fa (p. 95).4 Keefe claims: 
  
1. ‘On the standard hierarchical conception of higher-order vagueness, 
there are <such cases>’. (p. 95)  
                                                          
4 There is a typo in the second formula which I have corrected. 
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2. ‘Even if we can’t produce a definitive clear first-order borderline 
case, we can typically distinguish between borderline clear Fs and 
borderline clear not-Fs.’ (p. 96) Bobzien’s theory does not keep those 
types of second-order borderline cases apart, and, by inference, is 
‘counterintuitive’. (p. 96)  
3. Keefe claims that the first cases are likely clearly not clearly not F, the 
last are likely clearly not clearly F. Thus we obtain the two cases 
¬CCFa¬C¬CFaC¬C¬Fa and ¬C¬C¬Fa¬CC¬FaC¬CFa. 
Again, Keefe claims, Bobzien’s theory does not allow for this 
distinction. (p. 9596)  
4. ‘Any individual’s categorisation through the sorites series will 
distinguish between these cases’. (p. 96) 
5. ‘There will typically be widespread agreement that something a well-
placed observer is inclined to call borderline clearly red should 
definitely/clearly not also count as clearly orange.’ (p. 96)  
6. ‘A plausible view of higher-order vagueness would require a theory 
to keep those types of second-order borderline cases apart. (p. 96) 
 
Let me first get a few small points out of the way.  
 
Keefe’s Point 1 is straightforwardly false. In the standard hierarchical 
conception of higher-order vagueness there are no borderline-clearly-F 
cases and no borderline-clearly-not-F cases. The standard hierarchical 
conception, or in any case the one I define and discuss in the paper, is 
the one presented e.g. by Sainsbury 1991, pp. 1689, and in Shapiro 
2005 and 2006, and was introduced in my Section I, entitled Columnar 
Higher-order Vagueness and Hierarchical Higher-order Vagueness, based on 
these and similar publications. Point 4 is also straightforwardly false. 
There are many individuals, philosophers and others, who do not 
distinguish these cases. (Keefe does not back up her universal claim with 
evidence.) Point 5 conflates the red/not-red distinction with the 
red/orange distinction. Only the first leads to a Sorites paradox. Still, 
even if we replace ‘orange’ with ‘not-red’ in her sentence, the truth of her 
claim would depend on what notion of borderlineness the well-placed 
observers are using. If it is Shapiro’s and Sainsbury’s, they will not have 
the inclination Keefe mentions. The truth of Point 6 could reasonably 
be doubted, given what I said about points 1 and 4. In any event, my 
own theory does allow one to keep apart the two types of second-order 
borderline cases Keefe mentions, see my response to Points 2 and 3 
below.   
 
Keefe’s Point 2 is also false, since my theory can keep Keefe’s two types 
of second-order borderline cases apart. This is easily shown. First we 
distinguish between the logic I introduce and my theory of vagueness. 
My logic has as its purpose to pinpoint the structural features of vague 
expressions that are responsible for (i) there being a grey area, or 
penumbra, in any Sorites series, and (ii) our being unable to say where this 
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grey area starts or ends; and moreover (iii) to forestall any higher-order 
vagueness paradoxes in the course of this. My logic is not meant to 
reflect all reasonable natural language uses of ‘borderline’, not even all 
those uses people may come up with when confronted with a Sorites 
paradox. So the logic does not provide for the two cases Keefe 
introduces, because in my view distinguishing such cases does nothing to 
further its purpose, nor does it anything to further a solution of the 
Sorites. My theory of vagueness, on the other hand, accommodates those 
two kinds of borderline clear cases just fine. There is a natural language 
use of ‘borderline’ that I call only-just borderlineness. An object a is 
borderline F in this sense if and only if it is F, albeit only just. Using the 
term ‘borderline’ in this way, borderline-clearly-red cases are those that 
are clearly red, but only just. Equally, borderline-clearly-not-red cases are 
those that are clearly not-red, but only just. So my theory does satisfy the 
condition Keefe sets out in her Point 2. It does also satisfy the condition 
she sets out in her Point 3. With only-just borderlineness, borderline-clearly-
red cases are clearly not clearly not-red and borderline-clearly-not-red 
cases are clearly not clearly red. For, evidently, anything that is clearly red, 
even if only just, is not orange and also not not-red. And evidently, 
anything that is clearly not-red, even if only just, is not red. My theory 
thus explains easily why people distinguish between borderline-clearly-F 
and borderline-clearly-not-F things (Point 2), and does so in a way that 
makes perfect sense. And my theory also satisfies the condition Keefe set 
out in Point 3. 
 
Perhaps Keefe means that a theory of vagueness should, with one and the 
same notion of borderlineness (a notion with which what is borderline F 
is neither clearly F nor clearly not-F, and with which what is clearly F is 
such that we can tell that it is F) be able to explain why philosophers and 
other people distinguish, in a Sorites series, borderline-clearly-F cases, 
borderline-clearly-not-F cases and clearly-borderline-F cases. In my view, 
such a requirement is a non-starter. Still, let us consider this requirement. 
Keefe’s formulations in her Section II make it clear that in her view we 
can tell of the borderline-clearly-F things that they are borderline-clearly-
F, of the borderline-clearly-not-F things that they are borderline-clearly-
not-F, and of the clearly-borderline-F things that they are clearly-
borderline-F. The result is a sequence of the following third-order 
modalities, strung up along a Sorites series from F to F: 
 
1  CCCF     CBCF         CCBF  CBCF  CCCBF. 
 
Here we have four sharp borders, instead of the original one between the 
F and the not-F cases. So prima facie, this suggestion is no improvement. 
What would Keefe suggest at this point? Here are her options.  
 
(1) Fill in borderline cases between the clear cases, just as this was done 
with the sharp border between F and not-F by introducing clear cases 
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and borderline cases. Consider first the outer cases. We could fill in 
borderline cases in one of the following two ways (in bold):  
 
CCCF BBCF CBCF     CCBF   CBCF BBCF    CCCBF 
 
CCCF BCCF CBCF     CCBF   CBCF BCCF   CCCBF 
  
Neither makes much sense. What if we fill in the two middle cases? The 
two options are (in bold): 
 
CCCF CBCF   BCBF         CCBF    BCBF     CBCF  CCCBF  
 
CCCF CBCF   BBCF        CCBF    BBCF     CBCF  CCCBF 
 
Again, neither makes much sense. Additionally, this approach is well-
known to lead to higher-order vagueness paradoxes. So Keefe’s first 
option is doomed. 
 
(2) Keefe could opt for what I have called ‘in-between borderlineness’, 
and give up the idea of representing clarity and borderlineness with a 
modal logic that preserves compositionality of the borderline-operator. 
But this seems not to be what she has in mind.  
 
(3) Keefe could opt for saying that the reason why there are not four 
sharp borders in 1 is that, at some higher order, the cases at issue are 
borderline, and are so for all subsequent higher orders. Then we have 
something like: 
 
2 BnCmCCF     BnCmBCF     BnCmCBF      BnCmBCF BnCmCCBF 
 
with m a finite number, and for any n.5 The problem with this suggestion 
is that Keefe’s argument then crumbles. Both for the existence of clearly-
borderline-F and for the existence of borderline-clearly-F and 
borderline-clearly-not-F her argument relies on the assumption that 
individuals take it to be obvious that there are such cases. But if (at some 
higher level) those individuals cannot tell whether a case is clearly-
borderline-F, etc., then there is nothing obvious about these cases 
anymore. In fact, if one can tell that CA but cannot tell whether one can 
tell that CA, one is epistemically in exactly the same position one is in 
with my own theory, where precisely this is also true. So, to sum up, 
whichever way one turns, Keefe’s main criticism in her Section II is 
unsuccessful.    
 
                                                          
5 This is pretty much the road Williamson goes down, although, pace Keefe (p.95), 
Williamson never says that his theory can accommodate clear borderline cases in a 
Sorites series, and for good reason.  
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Keefe’s main criticism in her Section III: If I accept axiom 4 I 
must accept axiom 5  
Keefe’s main point of criticism in her Section III (pp. 9699) is this. She 
claims that, given my interpretation of clarity in (Bobzien 2010), if I 
accept axiom 4 (CACCA) I have to accept axiom 5 (CACCA). 
She supports this claim with the further claim that a competent speaker 
of the kind I introduce in my 2010, a CRISP that is, ‘will or at least 
should  doubt her competence’ (98), and that this would commit me to 
axiom 5.  
 
Keefe’s objection fails. First of all, it is criticism based on the concept of 
a CRISP (a competent, rational, informed speaker, and the interpretation 
of the C-operator from (Bobzien 2010). As such it is no criticism of the 
paper to which she replies (Bobzien 2015), which does not rely on 
(Bobzien 2010). In particular, my present view has evolved beyond the 
one I presented in (Bobzien 2010). Second, Keefe disregards my 2010 
definition of the C-operator in terms of CRISPs. In her argument, she 
ignores the fact that the competence of CRISPs (their CRISPness, for 
short) is indexed to the bracket of the expression with regard to which 
they are competent. But it is so indexed. As a result, my claim is that 
those CRISPs who are competent with regard to both CRISPness and Fa 
can tell that they can tell that Fa. And since CRISPness is transparent, 
those CRISPs (the ones that are competent with regard to their 
CRISPness regarding Fa) have no reason to doubt their competence. 
Third, in her argument, Keefe also ignores the fact that the ability to tell 
that is part of the interpretation of the C-operator is defined not by a 
CRISP’s competence, but modally quantifies over all CRISPs indexed to 
the expression with regard to which they are competent.  ‘It is clear that 
A’ is thus short for ‘In all possible situations of evaluating all competent 
speakers can tell that A’. Given these three points, Keefe’s main criticism 
in her Section III falls flat. With or without my 2010, my acceptance of 
axiom 4 does in no way commit me to accept axiom 5. (Keefe’s 
objection is somewhat similar to saying that if a theory implies the semi-
decidability of a set of questions , then it implies the decidability of .) 
 
Keefe’s main criticism in her Section V: introducing a technical 
term in philosophy is bad 
Since what I have to say about Keefe’s main objection in her Section IV 
depends on what I have to say about her main objection in Section V, I 
start with Section V (pp. 102106). Keefe’s main criticism here is that 
my use of the expression ‘borderline’ is technical (Section V, passim). 
More specifically, Keefe claims that ‘regarding <the operator> C <and 
hence the operator B> as a technical term undermines the attempt to 
uncover the structure of vagueness and borderlineness’ (p.103), and that, 
if my use of the expression ‘borderline’ is technical, this ‘leaves open the 
question what the real structure of borderline cases is and since vagueness is 
so closely tied to borderline cases, we have no reason to think that the theory 
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<Bobzien suggests> illuminates vagueness at all’ (ibid., my italics). 
Frankly, I find what Keefe says about my use of technical terms 
puzzling, for a variety of reasons.  
 
First, the vast majority of uses of ‘borderline case’ and ‘borderline 
borderline’ are technical: almost all occurrences are philosophical, 
medical or legal terminology. The idea that there is a natural use of 
‘borderline’ that technical uses try to capture is empirically unfounded. 
(Where I use ‘technical term’ in (Bobzien 2015), I assume a simple 
dictionary definition: a word that has a specific meaning within a specific 
field of expertise.) 
 
Second, there are at least five structurally different and mutually 
incompatible – potential – natural uses of ‘borderline’. Hence when 
Keefe talks about ‘the natural notion’ or ‘the natural language 
<operator>’6  (italics mine) this is unhelpful. In addition to the natural-
language uses of borderline distinguished in (Bobzien 2015) and 
(Bobzien 2013), there are the above-mentioned only-just use, the not-
quite use (a is borderline F if it is almost F, but not quite), and the quite 
different case of borderline-borderlineness in which one predicate is a 
borderline case of another predicate that is a borderline case of still 
another predicate (e.g. ‘is pudding’ of ‘is solid’ and ‘is custard’ of ‘is 
pudding’).7  
 
Third, philosophers frequently confuse different presumed natural uses 
of ‘borderline’, to detrimental effect for their theories, which suggests 
this may not be such a good route to take. (This is the main topic of 
(Bobzien 2013)).  
 
Fourth, Keefe’s claim that ‘vagueness is so closely tied to borderline 
cases <in a unique non-technical sense of “borderline case”>’ is simply 
false. There is no prima facie connection between ordinary language uses 
of ‘borderline’ and the Sorites. Over the last few decades, philosophers 
have unsuccessfully grappled with the Sorites paradox by using the 
expression ‘borderline case’ in various, often incompatible, ways. 
However, the Sorites has been discussed for over 2300 years. 
 
Fifth, what vagueness  is closely tied to is some sort of hedging behaviour 
and possible disagreement and fickleness people display when asked to 
say of some non-polar cases of a sorites series whether they are F. That 
is, all there is, is a certain set of empirical data of speaker behaviour which can quite 
easily be described without ever using the term ‘borderline case’. This point cannot 
be made too emphatically. Philosophers resort to the use of the 
                                                          
6 Cf. ‘the natural language notion of ‘clearly’ (sic)’ (Keefe 2015,  p.104), ‘a Definitely 
operator resembling the natural language one (sic)’ (ibid. p.103). 
7 And of course these can be combined, so for example Sorensen 2010 mixes a number 
of these together. 
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expression ‘borderline’ in order to describe certain phenomena like 
hedging behaviour, or undetectable switches in truth-evaluations, and the 
like. Generally, they do not try and device a theory that captures the 
natural language use of ‘borderline’. This too makes it clear that Keefe’s 
claim that “vagueness is so closely tied to borderline cases (in a unique 
non-technical sense of ‘borderline case’)” (p. 103) is simply false. 
 
Sixth, I have made clear in my paper (p. 65, p. 66) that my interest is in 
certain philosophical problems that are directly related to the Sorites, not 
in the investigation of the semantics of natural language expressions. If it 
was illegitimate to try to uncover the logical structure that underlies a 
philosophical problem if there was no natural language expression in 
existence that would capture it, progress in philosophy would be severely 
hampered. The fact that for millennia philosophers have introduced new 
terms into their language in order to express their solutions to 
philosophical problems, and are still very busy doing just this, should 
speak for itself. 
 
Seventh, as I say explicitly in the paper to which Keefe responds 
(Bobzien 2015, p.65, p. 66), I have not used the natural language 
expressions ‘clear’ and  ‘borderline’ in order to capture any intuitions that 
may come with some common use.8 The reason I use the expression 
‘borderline’ for the analogue to the contingency operator in 
QKT4M+BF+FINAX is that it shares a large number of structural 
features with the analogues to the contingency operators in other modal 
logics that have been used in attempts by other philosophers to capture 
what is characteristic for vagueness, and which these other philosophers 
call ‘borderline cases’.   Like my own, these other modal theories that 
have been suggested (i) generally aim at capturing the distinction 
between what’s inside and what’s outside the grey area. (ii) They use the 
structural equivalents of a necessity and a contingency operator. (iii) They 
assume that their analogue to the necessity operator is factive or veridical, 
and accordingly include axiom T. (iv) They call the cases picked out by 
the analogue to the contingency operator borderline cases. (v) Their 
borderline cases are defined by the axioms and rules of their modal system. 
As such, each of these theories uses ‘borderline case’ as a technical term. 
(vi) A final shared feature is the syntactic definition of higher-order vagueness. 
Most theories that employ modal logic maintain that there is higher-
order vagueness in the sense that there are borderline-borderline cases, 
borderline-borderline-borderline cases, etc. And these theories use the 
term higher-order vagueness as follows, with minor variations in 
terminology: ‘Object a is a first-order borderline case of F in modal 
system S iff BFa in S. And a is an n+1th-order borderline case in S iff 
BnBFa in S.’ This is a standard way of defining higher-order vagueness 
                                                          
8 ‘I have no interest in providing a semantics for the natural language expression ‘can 
tell’.’ (Bobzien 2015, 65), ‘I am not interested in the semantics of the natural language 
expression ‘it is clear’.’ (ibid. 66). 
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qua borderline-borderlineness, and I use it in exactly the same way. So 
modally my theory is expressed with a borderlineness operator, and with 
higher-order vagueness each defined syntactically in exactly the same way 
other theories do that define vagueness modally. The difference lies in 
which modal system is chosen. 
 
So, Keefe’s objection to my use of ‘borderline’ as a technical term and 
her claim that this ‘undermines the attempt to uncover the structure of 
vagueness and borderlineness’ (p. 103) seem to me entirely unfounded.   
 
A second major criticism in Keefe’s Section V is her point that some kind 
of sharp boundaries are part of my theory. More precisely, Keefe 
presents the fact that my theory defines vagueness in such a way that to 
the left and right of the borderline zone there are a last clearly-F case and 
a first clearly-not-F case as if this were an extremely rare and very terrible 
thing (Keefe 2015, Section V passim). So, let me say this. First of all, my 
theory has sharp boundaries only in the sense that there is a last clearly-F 
case and that there is a first clearly-not-F case. With allowances for 
terminology (‘clear’, ‘definite’, ‘determinate’, etc.) such sharp boundaries 
are present in the vast majority of theories of vagueness: epistemicism, 
degree theories, glut theories, gap theories, various contextualist theories 
and supervaluationism, including Keefe’s own brand of 
supervaluationism. In other words, this kind of sharp boundaries are the 
norm, not the exception. It is unclear to me why Keefe spends so much 
energy on criticising a feature of my theory that it shares with her own. 
 
Keefe’s main criticism in her Section IV: Columnar higher-order 
vagueness contains an assumption that cannot be verified    
Keefe’s main point of criticism in her Section 4 (pp. 100102) is this. 
She claims (a) that it is problematic that ‘the theory <of columnar 
higher-order vagueness> is committed to “not clearly X”, where X is 
one of its own basic assumptions’ (p. 100). And she claims (b) that the 
theory ‘declares a key element of itself <i.e. X> merely of borderline 
status’, which she thinks ‘is, at best, odd’ (p.102). I take these two points 
in turn. First, the objection needs some unpacking. What Keefe claims to 
be my assumption X is  
 
3  ¬C¬xBFx 
 
and what she claims to be the problematic statements I am committed to 
are 
 
4 ¬C¬C¬xBFx. 
 
and  
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5 B¬C¬xBFx.9 
 
My actual assumption is  
 
6 For any Sorites series a1 to an of a predicate φ, ¬C¬xBφx.
10 
 
Accordingly, Keefe’s objection should run more precisely ‘the theory 
<of columnar higher-order vagueness> is committed to “not clearly X”  
and “borderline X” where the consequent X of one of its own basic 
second-order-universal assumptions is such that one cannot tell whether 
X.’  
 
For now I disregard the point that the assumptions and the two 
commitments are each relative to there being a Sorites series with F, and, 
for the purpose of argument, assume Keefe’s two points to be correct, 
i.e., that my theory is committed to the combination of 3 and 4 and to 
the combination of 3 and 5. 
 
The combination of 3 and 4:  Keefe herself notes (i) that a claim that a basic 
assumption A of one’s theory is unclear (so that one cannot tell whether 
A) is very problematic for any theory that, like her own 
supervaluationism, holds that borderline cases have a third semantic 
value but (ii) that such a claim ‘looks a lot less problematic’ ‘if we move 
to an epistemic reading of C’ as “can tell that”, since it is not ‘in 
general … an unacceptable consequent of a theory that by its own lights 
we do not and cannot know <one of its basic assumptions> to be true’ 
(p. 101). Now, in the paper to which she responds, I only present the 
bivalent version of columnar higher-order vagueness, and say nothing 
about what kind of non-bivalent version I envisage. Let me here simply 
say that I do not envisage it as having a third semantic value, beyond 
truth and falsehood. (The reader will have to wait for my paper on modal 
semantics for columnar higher-order vagueness for details.)  
 
The combination of 3 and 5: This leaves us with Keefe’s claim that the fact 
that columnar higher-order vagueness ‘declares a key element of itself 
merely of borderline status’ (p. 102), ‘is, at best, odd’. Keefe backs up her 
criticism with the fact that my clarity-operator C is defined in terms of 
borderlineness and not the other way about (p.101). Now, although it is 
true that I understand the C-operator in terms of the B-operator, i.e. as 
non-borderlineness, what matters is not this fact, but that, in turn, I 
define the B-operator in terms of ‘can tell’, as set out in the paper and 
above. If we account for the definition of the B-operator in terms of 
‘tell-ability’, what remains of Keefe’s criticism boils down to the 
                                                          
9 She does not say how she gets to 5. 
10 Bobzien 2015 p. 72 (4.3). Or, with my interpretation of the C-operator: ‘For any 
Sorites sequence a1 to an of a predicate φ, one cannot rule out (i.e. cannot tell that it is 
not the case) that it contains a borderline case of φ.’ 
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following. Since the structure of tell-ability (as defined by the box-
operator of the logic QKT4M+BF+FINAX) is designed specifically to 
capture the epistemic constraint of inability-to-tell which is to explain the 
hedging phenomenon in Sorites series (rather than any old inability to 
tell), it is objectionable or odd that 
 
a basic assumption A of the theory of columnar higher-
order vagueness is itself such that one cannot tell whether 
A, where ‘cannot tell whether A’ is designed to structurally 
approximate the phenomenon of hedging behaviour in 
Sorites series.  
 
If we now add the relativity to Sorites series from 6 above, we see that 
accurately formulated the criticism would be: it is objectionable or odd 
that  
 
the basic assumption of the theory of columnar higher-
order vagueness, that for any Sorites series with F, xBFx 
(or ¬C¬xBFx), is such that one cannot tell whether 
xBFx (or ¬C¬xBFx), where ‘cannot tell whether’ is 
designed to structurally approximate the phenomenon of 
hedging behaviour in Sorites series (by the modal logic 
QKT4M+BF+FINAX, of course).  
 
Thus the real question is not whether this sounds odd, but whether a logic 
that, for Sorites series with F, has both ¬C¬xBFx and B¬C¬xBFx 
can be the right logic for vagueness. As I said above, the main point of 
(Bobzien 2015) is precisely that this is the right logic for vagueness. As 
far as I can see, it is the only normal modal logic that can in one go (i) 
explain the hedging phenomenon in the sense that it reasonably 
approximates the area where people hedge and (ii) avoid introducing two 
or more sharp boundaries in place of one11 and (iii) avoid all known 
higher-order vagueness paradoxes. (It can also be given a plausible 
philosophical interpretation, based on the viewpoint relativity of our 
assessments in the grey area. I explore this point in a different paper, 
which provides an interpretation of the modal semantics of 
QKT4M+BF+FINAX.)  
 
Now, if one thinks that the purpose of the modal operator for 
borderlineness is to define extensions for various kinds of borderline and 
non-borderline cases (clearly borderline, borderline borderline, 
borderline clear, clearly borderline not, etc.) along a Sorites series, one is 
bound to miss the purpose the logic QKT4M+BF+FINAX. The 
purpose is not to define extensions (if it were, there would be no 
                                                          
11 It does so by precluding a decision as to whether there is one or there are two such 
boundaries. 
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difference to S5). The purpose is to introduce the logical structure of a 
very specific kind of epistemic constraint which we encounter, for 
example, when being marched through a Sorites. And which is 
characteristic for vague predicates. This structure is a structure of semi-
decidability – as I illustrated it in the summary representation of the 
paper at the Joint Session.12  
  
* * * 
  
I conclude with some points where Keefe seems to have either 
misunderstood my paper or drawn inaccurate conclusions from what I 
say. 
 
On p. 91, Keefe writes: ‘Bobzien models her structure with the modal 
logic S4M.’ Strictly speaking, this is inaccurate. I distinguish between a 
general logic of columnar higher-order vagueness and a normal modal 
logic of columnar higher-order vagueness. The latter is quantified. So, 
neither logic is S4M.   
 
On p. 92 Keefe writes: ‘Since all borderline cases are also borderline 
borderline cases, Bobzien must deny that there are clear borderline cases’ 
(Italics mine). Here Keefe seems to misunderstand my theory, reversing 
explanans and explanandum.  It is my firm view that there are no clear 
borderline cases that are expressible modally as set out on p.66 in (2.1) 
and that are relevant to the Sorites paradox. And it is for this reason that I 
introduce theorem V, that if something is borderline, it is borderline 
borderline – not the other way about. (This is explained in detail in my 
2010, which Keefe cites.)  
 
On p. 93 Keefe writes: ‘Bobzien criticizes what she calls ‘in-between 
borderlineness … . Instead she endorses “undecidability 
borderlineness”.’ Keefe here seems to have misunderstood my view on 
the two conceptions of borderlineness. I do not criticize in-between 
borderlineness at all. I fully endorse it. What I criticize is that 
philosophers conflate the two uses of ‘borderline’ that I mention and 
that this confusion gives rise to the so-called higher-order vagueness 
paradoxes. (I set this out in detail in my 2013, which Keefe cites, and 
also on pp.77-80 in very paper to which Keefe replies, i.e. Bobzien 
2015.)   
 
On p. 94 Keefe writes: ‘the two conceptions <of borderlineness> may 
be neither exhaustive nor accurate’. This implies that she thinks it is my 
view that the two conceptions of borderlineness are exhaustive. 
However this is not my view. As I mentioned above, it is my view that 
                                                          
12 https://lecturecapture.warwick.ac.uk/ess/echo/presentation/15cf5dd2-f22b-49d6-
a393-0a613a9caf5d?ec=true 
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there are at least five structurally different natural language uses of 
‘borderline’. Of these I discuss the two that I believe are frequently 
confounded in discussions of vagueness. In fact, Keefe herself quotes a 
sentence of my paper in which I imply that there are more than two uses 
of ‘borderline’ (see above, on her Section I: ‘or still another kind of 
borderlineness’). 
 
On p. 95 Keefe writes: ‘[A]n advocate of Williamson’s epistemic 
view can accommodate clear borderline cases’. I doubt that 
Williamson’s theory of vagueness as a whole can accommodate clear 
borderline cases. Williamson never says he can. But assume for the sake 
of argument that he can. One can then easily show that the only clear 
borderline cases Williamson can have are those that are borderline clear 
at some higher order. That is, if a is borderline F  and you can tell that a 
is borderline F, then from some higher order upwards, you cannot tell 
whether you can tell whether/that you can tell … whether/that you can 
tell that a is borderline F. No argument of the kind Keefe adduces 
(p.9495), that it is obvious that there are clear borderline cases, has any 
relevance to Williamson’s theory.  
 
On p. 96, with footnote 5, Keefe writes: ‘One way to show that <in 
her theory the borderline clearly F and the borderline clearly not-F 
cases> coincide is to appeal to the result cited in Bobzien (2013), that 
formulae starting with ¬C and having an odd number of negation signs 
(e.g. ¬CCFa, the first conjunct of the first type of case) are equivalent to 
¬CFa and those starting with ¬C and having an even number of 
negation signs (e.g. the second conjunct, ¬C¬CFa) are equivalent to 
¬C¬Fa. Both types of second-order borderline case are thus provably 
equivalent to ¬CFa ¬C¬Fa, that is, a first-order borderline case.’   
 
This argument is fallacious. (1) Whether Keefe’s borderline clearly F and 
borderline clearly not-F are provably equivalent to a first-order 
borderline case depends on whether they are clearly borderline clearly 
F/not-F or not clearly borderline clearly F/not-F. And since for Keefe 
these cases are the ones which we can typically pick out, or in any case 
well-placed observers can (p. 96), and thus one can tell that they are 
borderline clearly F/not-F, the right way to formalize them would be as 
CBCFa and CBC¬Fa. Thus we obtain C[¬CCFa¬C¬CFa] and by -
distribution C¬CCFaC¬C¬CFa which according to the source on 
which she relies (Bobzien 2013)  is equivalent with the contradiction 
C¬FaCFa. The same holds for C[¬CC¬Fa¬C¬CFa] which by -
distribution provides C¬CC¬FaC¬C¬C¬Fa and by the equivalence 
rule she relies on the contradictory CFaC¬Fa. This is exactly as it 
should be according to my theory, which does not have, and is not 
meant to have, clear borderline cases with the borderlineness relevant to 
the Sorites.  (2) If Keefe suggested that one cannot tell of any BCF/not-F 
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case that it is BCF/not-F, then she is in the same situation with regard to 
her claim that we can tell that the borderline cases on the left are BCF 
and those on the right are BCnot-F as if she adopted my theory. 
(Williamson is in this situation. For him all borderline clearly F cases, i.e. 
all cases governed by his equivalent for BCF, are such that we can’t 
know that they are BCF – or else his solution to the Sorites fails, see 
Bobzien 2012, pp. 205-10.)  (3) If Keefe were to suggest that one can tell 
of some but not necessarily all BCF/not-F cases that they are BCF/not-
F, this does not improve things. Since by her own lights, these are the 
cases right next to the clearly clear F/not-F cases, we can tell of the left-
most and right-most cases that they are BCF/not-F respectively, and we 
have a sharp border between the CC and the CB cases at both ends. Of 
course she may say that, where that border is, we have BCC and BCB 
cases (like Williamson would). But as long as we can tell of some cases 
that they are BCF/not-F, we can infer that those to their left (for CBCF) 
or right (for CBCnot-F) are also CBCF/not-F (by Keefe’s own 
assumption), except if we assume that they are BCBCF/not-F, which 
leads us back to the – unsuccessful options (1) and (2).  
 
In sum, either Keefe’s borderline clear cases are not clearly so, which is 
incompatible with Keefe’s own assumption, or they are clear borderline 
clear cases, which leads to (at least) two sharp borders of the kind those 
who introduce a modal operator to express borderlineness aim to avoid: 
sharp borders between Can and Can+1. Columnar higher-order 
vagueness avoids such sharp borders.  
 
On p. 97 Keefe writes: ‘In this paper <i.e. Bobzien 2015>, she 
maintains that C is a technical term, so she may no longer be committed 
to such interpretations <i.e. as in her 2010>’ (italics Keefe’s). In fact, I 
very clearly present my use of ‘borderline’ as technical in my 2010 (esp. 
pp. 8-18).  
 
On p. 99 Keefe claims (referring to Bobzien 2012, pp. 194-195) that if 
the pair of sentences ‘it’s clear that A’ and ‘it’s unclear whether it’s clear 
that A’ are judged to contradict by many people, then the pair of 
sentences ‘it’s unclear whether A’ and ‘it’s unclear whether it’s unclear 
whether A’ must be so judged by these people – where ‘unclear’, would 
express the ‘doubt characteristic of borderline cases’. Keefe provides no 
reasons for this claim, and I believe it to be false. 
 
On p. 101 Keefe writes about the assumption she discusses in her 
Section IV: ‘The assumption, note, is much weaker than the claim that 
there are borderline cases: it is merely the claim that it is not clear that 
there are not.’ This is correct. The implication that it is not part of my 
theory that there are borderline cases (and that this is a negative feature 
Susanne Bobzien 
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of my theory) however, is not correct. It is easy to see that in 
S4+BF+FINAX my assumption entails that there are borderline cases.13  
 
On p. 102 Keefe writes about the motivation for going beyond first-
order vagueness: ‘[t]he need to avoid replacing the two-fold categories 
with three (equally sharp) ones is a typical part of the explanation of the 
need to accommodate higher-order vagueness’ and that columnar 
higher-order vagueness is unsuitable as a theory of higher-order 
vagueness, since its ‘three columns or categories of cases’ commit it ‘to 
sharp boundaries’. 
 
This shows that Keefe misses the point of my using S4+BF+FINAX for 
higher-order vagueness, and simply treats it as if it was S5. To see the 
point of S4+BF+FINAX, one has to be willing to think out of the box. 
As I say in the paper (p.68), it is the combination of the meta-principles 
(2.12) CA  CnA for any n, and (2.13) BA  BnA for any n, that ensure 
that borderlineness and radical higher-order borderlineness are co-
extensive and that clarity and radical higher-order clarity are co-
extensive. And as is generally known, the motivation for introducing 
radical higher-order vagueness is that it will avoid a sharp border 
between the non-borderline or clear and the borderline cases. And it 
does so irrespective of whether it is co-extensive with first-order 
vagueness. In this way, the theory retains the feature of radical higher-
order vagueness without leading to any known higher-order vagueness 
paradox. (Readers not familiar with this discussion are invited to study 
the literature, including Sainsbury 1991, Shapiro 2005, and especially 
Wright 1992 and Zardini 2013, in connection with Section VI of 
Bobzien 2015.) 
 
On p. 104 Keefe writes: ‘On Bobzien’s picture, the appeal to a technical 
term to do the work of modelling borderlineness does not build on a 
background theory of the semantics of vague predicates.’ This is 
inaccurate. My theory does build on a semantic theory: a Kripke 
semantics for first-order logic, which I specify as reflexive, transitive and 
final (Bobzien 2015 pp. 61, 68, 70). I also provide a detailed 
philosophical interpretation, or ‘background theory’, based on the 
viewpoint sensitivity of assessments of sentences with vague predicates 
in contexts. I do this in a different paper, since it is not the topic of 2015. 
                                                          
13 Proof: 
(1)  CxBFx    assumption  
(2)  CxBFx   theorem of S4+BF+FINAX* 
(3)  CxBFx CxBFx  1, 2 -introduction  
(4)  BxBFx     3 def B  
(5)  xBFx BxBFx   theorem of S4+BF+FINAX  
(6)  BxBFxxBFx   5 PC 
(7)         xBFx         5, 6 MP 
* A proof of (2) can be found in Appendix II (i) of (Bobzien 2015).  
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(The topic of Bobzien 2015 is not the philosophical interpretation of the 
semantics, but the element of my theory  by which vagueness and 
higher-order vagueness coincide and that is responsible for the fact that 
it avoids all known higher-order vagueness paradoxes, both topics about 
which Keefe says nothing.)   
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